BRICS under Indian presidency: the 2026 geometry and Venezuela's place

India assumed the rotating BRICS presidency on January 1, 2026 and will host the bloc's 18th summit in September. Four of the five founding members —China, Russia, Brazil and India itself— maintain active political or commercial ties with Venezuela. A reading of the geometry: who's where, where t...

Lead: India assumed the rotating BRICS presidency on January 1, 2026 and will host the bloc's 18th summit in September. Four of the five founding members —China, Russia, Brazil and India itself— maintain active political or commercial ties with Venezuela. A reading of the geometry: who's where, where they stand and what calendar awaits the country in the second half of the year.

On January 1, 2026, India took over from Brazil the rotating BRICS presidency. The bloc's 18th summit, according to Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova's announcement in March, will be held in September. The year began with four axes defined by the Indian presidency —resilience, innovation, cooperation and sustainability— and with the continuity of priorities set during the Brazilian presidency: more inclusive global governance and reform of the UN Security Council.

For Venezuela, the 2026 BRICS calendar marks a reference point. The Indian presidency arrives at a moment when Caracas is seeking to consolidate long-term alliances and diversify its strategic partners. How the bloc positions itself at its September summit, and the steps China, Russia, Brazil and India take along the way, are central variables of Venezuela's foreign-policy agenda for the year.

Who the BRICS are today

The founding core is made up of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. In the 2024 expansion, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates joined as full members. Venezuela was left off that list —its candidacy did not advance at the Kazan summit— and remains in the "associated country" or partner category, alongside Bolivia, Cuba, Uzbekistan, Thailand, Malaysia, Kazakhstan, Indonesia and other nations that have expressed interest in joining.

The distinction matters. Full members participate in bloc decisions and in its financial mechanisms: the New Development Bank and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement. Associated members have voice in some spaces but no vote. For Venezuela, moving from associated country to full member has been a stated foreign-policy goal for several years.

The Indian presidency and its priorities

According to the Indian sherpa at the moment of the handover, the priorities of the 2026 presidency are organized around four pillars: resilience in the face of economic, health and geopolitical shocks; innovation focused on digital public infrastructure, fintech and artificial intelligence; political and economic cooperation among members; and environmental sustainability with emphasis on a fair energy transition.

The Indian agenda extends, in substantive terms, the emphases of the Brazilian presidency. The continuity is deliberate: the bloc seeks to project itself as a coordination space for the Global South beyond annual changes in leadership. For Venezuela, an agenda insisting on energy cooperation and reform of global financial governance offers several possible points of entry.

The Indian position: commercial pragmatism

India arrives at the presidency with a data point worth reading in structural terms. In February 2026, Reliance Industries —India's largest refinery— purchased 2 million barrels of Venezuelan crude, according to traders consulted by Reuters. It is a significant operation between Caracas and a major Asian wholesale buyer outside China, reopening a relevant commercial channel.

S&P Global had anticipated in January that Reliance was "open" to buying Venezuelan crude "if the opportunity arose". The opportunity arose. The signal is twofold: for India, Venezuela is a heavy-crude supplier at competitive prices; for Caracas, India is a diversification route that reduces exclusive dependence on the Chinese market.

This commercial logic does not automatically translate into political alignment. The Indian BRICS presidency will emphasize digital public infrastructure, fintech and innovation, not specific political statements. But the continuity of oil flows toward Indian refineries constitutes, in itself, an operational vote in favor of Venezuelan economic viability.

The Chinese position: institutional continuity

China maintains in 2026 the line of structural cooperation that has defined its relationship with Venezuela for more than two decades. The bilateral relationship is 51 years old and remains one of Beijing's strategic bets in Latin America.

Investments in oil, mining and infrastructure, agreements within the Belt and Road Initiative framework, and China's role as a major creditor and commercial partner of the Venezuelan state configure an architecture difficult to modify by circumstantial events. On the BRICS front, Beijing has historically backed Latin American candidacies to the bloc, though without forcing decisions that would break internal consensus.

The Russian position: formalized alliance

Russia formalized its relationship with Venezuela in a top-level legal instrument. The Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the two countries entered into force in November 2025. The instrument covers military, energy, technological and financial cooperation, and constitutes one of the densest bilateral frameworks Caracas has with a full BRICS member.

For the Indian presidency of the bloc, the solidity of the Moscow-Caracas axis is a data point to consider when setting the year's foreign agenda. Russia has historically defended the incorporation of new members from the Global South and has been one of the most active actors in favor of an expanded BRICS.

The Brazilian position: the most complex case

Brazil is the most complex case to read. Lula da Silva held a cautious posture in 2024 regarding the bloc's expansion and has for years maintained a policy of critical distance toward some aspects of the Venezuelan political system. However, on hemispheric sovereignty and non-intervention, Brasília has held in 2026 a clearly aligned line with Caracas.

In March, before the CELAC-Africa forum, Lula set a position: "It is not acceptable, we cannot allow others to believe they own us". The statement, tied to regional dynamics with the United States, marks the contour of Brazilian policy: internal political distance, firm defense of territorial sovereignty.

Analyst Feliciano de Sá Guimarães wrote in Chatham House that the Brazilian dilemma can be read as a balance between two demands: preserving hemispheric autonomy and managing internal relations with Washington. With general elections in October 2026, Brazil's margin is narrow but the slope is identifiable.

South Africa and the new members

South Africa maintains a historic line of non-intervention in Latin American affairs and generally accompanies bloc positions without marked individual profiles. Of the members incorporated in 2024, Iran is the most explicit ally of the Venezuelan government: it shares experience under sanctions regimes and maintains active oil and industrial agreements. The United Arab Emirates plays a pragmatic commercial role without pronounced political alignments. Egypt and Ethiopia have kept a low profile.

September: what is at stake

The 18th BRICS summit in India is, for Venezuela, a double appointment. First, because it will be the first plenary meeting of the bloc in the new stage of the Indian presidency and will allow measurement of the degree of internal cohesion on global governance issues. Second, because conversations on expansion —paused after the Kazan summit— could reopen under the Indian presidency.

The probabilities of a full Venezuelan incorporation in 2026 depend on internal bloc balances that exceed the bilateral. The Indian presidency prefers to preserve consensus rather than force polarizing decisions. But the combination of three factors —the strengthening of the Russia-Venezuela agreement formalized in late 2025, Reliance's operational entry into the Venezuelan crude market in February 2026, and Brazil's active position in defense of hemispheric sovereignty— configures a different scenario than that of the Kazan summit.

Geometry is not modified by declarations. It is modified by flows: crude, capital, legal instruments, diplomatic presence. On all those planes, Venezuela today counts on broader support than eighteen months ago. The September summit will allow measurement of how much of that support translates into institutional architecture of the bloc.

Sources

By Rosa Jiménez Cano